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Department Editor: Edgar Vanneman, Jr.*
THE CAUSBY CASE AND THE RELATION OF LANDOWNERS AND
AVIATORS - A NEW THEORY FOR THE PROTECTION
OF THE LANDOWNER
United States v. Causby et ux.1 involved a conflict between the Govern-
ment's operation of an airport for Army planes and the use of nearby
property as a home and chicken farm. The Causbys purchased 2.8 acres of
land in 1934, located about one-third of a mile from a municipal airport,
which had been used largely by private aircraft since 1928. In 1942 the
United States leased a nonexclusive use of the airport, the lease being re-
newable until 1967, or six months after the war emergency, whichever
occurred first. Approximately 4 per cent of the time in taking off and 7
per cent of the time in landing, the prevailing wind required aircraft using
the field to fly directly over the Causbys' house and chicken breeding farm.
The end of the runway was 2,220 feet from the house and 2,275 feet from
the barn so the 30 to 1 safe glide angle approved by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority permitted the planes to pass over the Causby property at a height
of 83 feet, 67 feet above the house and 18 feet above the highest tree. Pre-
vious flights of smaller planes had not seriously disturbed the Causbys, but
the heavy four-motored Army planes came over more frequently, made a
louder noise, and at night made a greater glare with their lights. The
Causbys asserted this disturbed their sleep, frightened them, and made them
nervous. They also asserted that the noise and light frightened the chick-
ens so much that about 150 had been killed by flying into the walls and that
egg production had fallen off.
The findings of the Court of Claims clearly establish that these flights
of heavy bombers had destroyed the use of the property as a commercial
chicken farm, the peace and comfort of the plaintiff's home had been seri-
ously intefered with, and the property had decreased in value.2 Since
at the time of this suit the Government was not suable in torts the plain-
tiffs alleged that their property was taken for public use without just com-
pensation in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. 4 The Court of Claims
found a servitude had been imposed on the land and a judgment of $2,000
was rendered for the plaintiffs.5 On appeal to the Supreme Court the judg-
ment was reversed for want of an additional finding of fact as to the exact
nature of the easement taken, but the Court held that a servitude had been
imposed on the Causbys' land which would merit a recovery under the Fifth
Amendment.0
Justice Black dissented because the effect of the decision, in his view,
was to limit, by the relatively absolute Constitutional barriers of the Fifth
Amendment, future adjustments through legislation and regulation which
might become necessary with the growth of air transport. According to
Justice Black the Constitution does not contain such a barrier. His posi-
* Journal Editor, Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University School
of Law.
1328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 1946 USAvR 235 (1946).
2 Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751, 755 (Ct. Cl. 1945), 1945 USAvR
1, 7. 1 This immunity, based on the attributes of sovereignty, was removed for
the purpose of most tort cases by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
Pub. L. No. 601, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 2, 1946) Title IV. But see notes 43,
44, 45 infra.
4 U.S. Const. Amend. V. "Nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."
5 Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945), 1945 USAvR 1.6 Supra note 1 at 1068, 1069.
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tion was that this was really a tort action for noise and glare and that there
was no Constitutional "taking." The Constitution gives Congress the power
to deal with the navigable airspace and Congress has acted under this
power to authorize the Civil Aeronautics Authority (Board) to establish
the safe altitude of flight, including a safe glide angle for landing and
taking-off. He concludes that Congress can be trusted to preserve the free-
dom of the air, and at the same time, satisfy the just claims of aggrieved
persons while the courts do not have the techniques to handle these com-
plicated problems.
The solution of the conflict of interest, i.e., the freedom of locomotion
versus the unrestricted enjoyment of one's property, has been debated by
legal writers for many years. 7 The problem was originally complicated by
the feeling that there was an immutable doctrine to the effect that owner-
ship of land extended to the periphery of the universe.8 Numerous writers
exposed the fallacy of this belief,9 Congress denied it,1o and it is now
clearly repudiated by the Supreme Court.1 '
The status of the aviator in his relation tothe property owner has also
been an important legal question. The American Law Institute approached
the problem with the concept that the airman has a "privilege" of flight.12
This position was criticized as putting too great a burden on the flyer by
requiring him to prove that his flight was justified, and of failing to recog-
nize freedom of activity or movement, i.e., "going places and doing things,"
as one of the fundamental interests of personality. 13 In the Causby case
the Court rejected the idea that the landowner has an unrestricted owner-
ship of the airspace above his land and declared the air to be a highway
in the public domain. 14 Thus the aviator's freedom of flight 15 would ap-
pear to be fully recognized so long as he observes the applicable laws. This,
however, does not settle the borderline cases, such as the Causby case, nor
explain the extent of the right remaining with the landowner. Numerous
formulas have been suggested to determine the interest of the landowner
in the superadjacent airspace of his land.16 They range from the unre-
7 Fagg, Airspace Ownership and the Right of Flight (1932) 3 J. Air L. 400;
Hise, Ownership and Sovereignty of the Air or Air Space Above Landowner's
Premises with Special Reference to Aviation (1931) 16 Iowa L. Rev. 169.
8 Lord Coke stated the doctrine as "eujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum"
which is usually translated, "He who owns the land owns up to the sky." For a
complete history of the maxim see Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests
of Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American Law (1932) 3 J. Air L. 329, 355-
373, 531-551.
9 Kingsley & Maugham, The Correlative Interests of the Landowner and the
Airman (1932) 3 J. Air L. 374; Bouv6, Private Ownership of Navigable Air
Space under the Commerce Clause (1935) 21 A.B.A.J. 416; Hackley, Trespass-
ers in the Sky (1937) 21 Minn. L. Rev. 773; Hotchkiss, The Law of Aviation (2d
ed. 1938) §31.
10 "The United States of America is hereby declared to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space above the United
States." 52 Stat. 1028 (1938), 49 USCA §176(a) (1945). "There is hereby
recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any citizen of the United States a
public right of freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air
space of the United States." 52 Stat. 980 (1938), 49 USCA §403 (1945).
11Supra note 1 at 1065, 1071. See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322
U.S. 292, 302-303, 1944 USAvR 1, 10 (1944) (concurring opinion of Justice Jack-
son also rejects ad coelum doctrine).
12 Restatement, Torts (1934) §194.
13 Green, The Torts Restatement (1935) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 582, 589-590; Hack-
ley, Trespassers in the Sky (1937) 21 Minn. L. Rev. 773, 803.
14 Supra note 1 at 1068. Notice also that Congress has declared that there
-is a public "right" to freedom of transit in air space, supra note 10.
15 Green, Flight of Aircraft-Right or Privilege? (1935) 6 J. Air L. 201;
Green, Trespass by Airplane (1936) 31 Ill. L. Rev. 499.16 Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Aviator
in Anglo-American Law (1932) 3 J. Air L. 329, 347-355.
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stricted ownership under the above-mentioned ad coelum doctrine to no
ownership in unenclosed airspace. But here now there is a judicially sanc-
tioned formula. The Court says, "The landowner owns at least as much
of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with
the land .... The fact that he does not occupy it in a physical sense - by
the erection of buildings and the like - is not material."'17 This has been
known as the "possible effective possession" theory as adopted by other
courts in previous cases' s but does not appear to correspond with the test
of actual use found in Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport19 cited by the
Court. The problem will bear further judicial clarification.
The important contribution of the Causby case appears to be its exten-
sion of the remedies available to the landowner. Formerly it was thought
that he was limited to tort actions in negligence, trespass, or nuisance.20
One low, unintentional flight might become actionable as a negligent harm.21
An intentional invasion of a property interest can be viewed as a trespass.22
This would include cases of an actual physical touching of the land or the
structures and emblements attached to it as well as invasions of the air-
space immediately adjacent.'thereto.23 Repeated invasions of the property
may constitute a continuing trespass or nuisance.24 But generally nuisance
will consist of a disturbance of privacy, imminence of danger, or disturb-
ance by noise, wind, or dust.25 Most modern codes do not require a specific
choice of remedy. But the plaintiffs in the Causby case were confronted
with a serious harm imposed by the United States Government which was
not suable in tort, so they were forced to go outside the usual scope of
relief for injuries of this nature and allege that the United States had made
such use of their property as to amount to a taking.
This was a case of first impression and there was little precedent for
the holding other than the historical development in,the body of law de-
17 Supra note 1 at 1067.
18 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 210, 203 (C.C.A. 6th, 1932),
1932 USAvR 1; Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977, 982 (W.D.N.Y.
1936), 1936 USAvR 16; Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 869, 20 S.E. (2d)
245, 249, 1946 USAvR 264 (1942). Massachusetts courts have adopted the ar-
bitrary theory that the landowner has title to the air space up to a height set by
statute and any flights below this are at least technical trespasses. Burnham v.
Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E. (2d) 575, 1942 USAvR 1 (1942);
see Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 530; 170 N.E. 385, 393,
1930 USAvR 1 (1930).
1984 F. (2d) 755 (C.C.A. 9th, 1936), 1936 USAvR 1 cert. denied, 300 U.S.
654, 1937 USAvR 173 (1937). Judge Haney, at page 758, says, "The owner of
land owns as much of the space above him as he uses, but only so long as he uses
it. All that lies beyond belongs to the world." This has been viewed as making
the landowner's rights depend, not upon possible use of such space, but upon
actual use. Hackley, Trespassers in the Sky (1937) 21 Minn. L. Rev. 773, 799.
It has also been called a "nuisance" theory since the right of recovery seems to
depend on a showing of actual damage. Note (1943) 28 Corn. L.Q. 200.
20 Supra note 1 at 1070 (dissenting opinion of Justice Black) ; Green, Flight
of Aircraft-Right or Privilege? (1935) 6 J. Air L. 201.
21 Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (N.D. Ohio,
1929), 1929 USAvR 96.
22 Hinman. v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (C.C.A. 9th, 1936), 1936
USAvR 1; Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385,
1930 USAvR 1 (1930); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.
(2d) 575, 1942 USAvR 1 (1942).
23 Hotchkiss, The Law of Aviation (2d ed. 1938) §34.
24 Warren Township School District v. Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W. (2d)
134, 1944 USAvR 35 (1944).25 Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. (2d) 245, 1946 USAvR 264
(1942); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817, 1934 USAvR 166(1933). See 140 A.L.R. 1362 for a summary of cases treating airports and
flights of aircraft as a nuisance.
JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
fining a "taking. ' 26 United States v. Cress,"7 a navigable water case, pro-
vided the rule that "it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of
damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that de-
termines the question whether it is a taking." 28 The Cress case also held
that the fee could remain in the landowner with the United States merely
taking the right to use the land by flooding at will. The analogy is close
in another respect in that the compensation required was half the value of
the property, this being the same percentage fixed by the Court of Claims
in the Causby case.
Reliance was also placed on Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
United States29 in which Justice Holmes took the position that it was possi-
ble to impose a servitude on land by firing coastal guns through the super-
adjacent airspace when this had the effect of limiting the utility of the land
and causing a dimunition of its value. The Portsmouth Harbor case was
decided on an implied contract theory, rather than a "taking" under the
Fifth Amendment, but this did not minimize the importance of the unusual
servitude recognized.
An analogy for the remedy recognized in the Causby case can be found
in the nuisance cases. Repeated trespasses and continuing nuisances, such
as invasions of floods, fumes, dust, and vibrations from neighboring land,
gave successive causes of action under the traditional common law view and
damages could only be given for those causes of action which had arisen be-
fore the commencement of the action.30  Injunctive relief or another suit
were the only remedies for the future. But relief by injunction became
discretionary with the court and was generally denied when the offending
enterprise was public or semipublic in character.3 ' Even some private en-
terprises were allowed to continue under a doctrine of balancing of con-
veniences. 32 Some jurisdictions then took the next logical step and assessed
permanent damages under a "permanent nuisance" doctrine which extended
to private enterprises as well as those having the power of eminent do-
main.3 3 A clear definition of permanence has not been forthcoming but a
more flexible practice now allows the plaintiff to elect to treat the nuisance
as a permanent one if it appears that it will continue indefinitely and per-
mits the jury to assess damages once for all on the basis of the depreciation
in va ue of the plaintiff's property.3 4 Since the plaintiff is precluded from
claiw'ng damages from a further continuance of the injury, a privilege
corn- rable to an easement is conferred upon the defendant 3 5
It would appear that the remedy given the landowner in the instant
case has a basic similarity to recoveries allowed under the modern nuisance
doctrines. But here we are dealing with an aviation problem that con-
26 See Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain (1931) 41 Yale
L.J. 221.
27 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
28 Id. at 328.
29 260 U.S. 327, 1928 USAvR 28 (1922).
80 Uline v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 101 N.Y. 98, 4 N.E. 536 (1886);
Bartlett v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 115 S.E. 451 (1922).
81 McClintock, Discretion to Deny Injunction Against Trespass and Nuisance
(1928) 12 Minn. L. Rev. 565.
82 Note (1933) 40 W. Va. L.Q. 59.
83 This doctrine seems to trace its origin to Town of Troy v. Cheshire R. Co.,
23 N.H. 83 (1851). The decisions are collected and discussed by Justice Brandeis
in City of Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933), a
leading case on the subject.
34 McCormick, Damages (1935) §127. For an even more intensive treat-
ment see McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land (1924) 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 574.
385 Thompson v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 191 Iowa 35, 179 N.W. 191 (1920);
Payne v. Bevel, 99 Okla. 106, 225 P. 691 (1923).
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cerns the relative rights of the landowner and the aviator. This use of the
navigable airspace is a modern development of such importance that ordi-
narily it cannot be enjoined. Yet there is actual and serious damage to
property by such flights. This damage is basic to recovery3 6 but when it
is present, the Causby case would appear to insist that recompense be made.
Municipal airports now have the power of eminent domain 3 7 but this in-
volves a duty to exercise it to prevent injury.38 Land not taken by con-
demnation proceedings cannot be "taken" otherwise without liability. Of
course there are limits to the remedy. A normal flight within the naviga-
ble airspace prescribed by legislation is not a "taking. '3 9 Take-offs and
landings present the problem and in those cases the altitude of 500 feet
provides no magic dividing line.40 Likewise such actions will probably be
strictly limited to comparable situations.
4 1
While the recently enacted Federal Tort Claims Act 4 2 may obviate the
necessity of many suits under this theory, Section 421(a) 4 3 can be inter-
preted to exclude claims for incidental damage to property 44 despite the
obvious intent of the framers of the Act to provide a substitute for prohib-
ited private bills. 4 5 Judicial interpretation is needed. In any event the
theory of the Causby case will be of special value in jurisdictions which do
36 United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land in Calcasieu Parish, La., 55 F. Supp.
461 (W.D. La. 1944), 1944 USAvR 36. This was a condemnation proceeding
and the planes were to pass over the land in question at a height of 25 to 40
feet. It was unimproved land in open country. The jury found no damage so
the Government's deposit was returned. See also Portsmouth Harbor Land &
Hotel Co. v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 572 (1928) (claim was denied on rehearing
for insufficient proof that any agent of the Government was authorized to take
the land in question and that the Government intended to fire the guns over the
property in time of peace).
37 This is a statutory matter in most states.
38See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1914);
Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 871, 20 S.E. (2d) 245, 250, 1946 USAvR
264 (1942); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 635-636, 42 N.E. 575,
579, 1942 USAvR 1 (1942).
39 Justice Douglas appears to assume that Congress, under the Commerce
Clause, can make a reasonable definition of navigable airspace. This would seem
warranted from the navigable water cases and the fact that the Fifth Amend-
ment must be read in conjunction with the rest of the Constitution. United.
States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
40 Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977, 982 (W.D.N.Y. 1936),
1936 USAvR 16 aff'd 88 F. (2d) 411 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937), 1938 USAvR 15. "The
height at which an airplane operator may pass above the surface without tres-
passing is a question depending for solution on the facts in the particular case,
and this question is unaffected by the regulations promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Commerce under the Air Commerce Act of 1926."
41 See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327,
330, 1928 USAvR 28 (1922) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis).
42 Pub. L. No. 601, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 2, 1946) Title IV.
43 Id. at §421 "The provisions of this title shall not apply to-(a) Any claim
based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute
or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a Federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused."
44 The House Committee's version omitted the exclusion of claims based on a
"nuisance not involving negligence" because it deemed the general exclusion of
claims based on authorized acts by government officers or employees exercising
due care sufficiently broad to include this particular problem. H. Rep. No. 2245,
to accompany S. 2221, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
45 Pub. L. No. 601, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 2, 1946) §131. The purpose
of §421(a) is also clarified by the Hearings before the Committee on the Judi-
ciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 28, 33, 64-66;
Armstrong and Cockrill, The Federal Tort Claims Bill (1942) 9 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 327, 330.
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not recognize the permanent nuisance doctrine.46 Of course, the nature
of the easement that may be taken is still an unanswered problem, as is the
use that may be made of such an easement.47 But future users of the rem-
edy are not without a formula for the Court has said, "The airplane is part
of the modern environment of life, and the inconveniences which it causes
are normally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The airspace,
apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public do-
main. We need not determine at this time what those precise limits are.
Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment
and use of the land."
48
HAROLD D. NAGEL*
PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST IN DOMESTIC NEW
ROUTE CASES
Applicants for certificates of public convenience and necessity to oper-
ate aircraft for hire as common carriers between places in interstate, over-
seas and foreign air transportation, as defined by the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, usually encounter the greatest difficulty in satisfying the Civil
Aeronautics Board that the proposed transportation is required by the
"public convenience and necessity."' In making this determination the
Board has considered foremost the Congressional "Declaration of Policy"
found in Section 2 of the Civil Aeionautics Act wherein in determining
"public interest" and "public convenience and necessity" the Board is ad-
monished to consider, among other things, the concern of the nation as a
whole in an economically sound, efficient, and reasonably competitive air
transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of
foreign and domestic commerce, of the Postal Service, and of the national
defense.2
In the earlier new route cases (distinguished from "grandfather" cases
under Section 401(e) of the Act) the Board set up four tests or criteria
of "public interest,"3 but in recent years has not enumerated these stand-
ards as such. An analysis of the Board's decisions to date on applications
to operate competing services or new routes (other than local or feeder
line services) indicates that the Board has consistently weighed three pri-
46 McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land (1934) 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 574.
47 Note (1937) 8 Air L. Rev. 52.
48 Supra note I at 1068. See also Opinion of the Attorney General of North
Carolina (1946) C.C.H. Avn. L. Serv. No. 2308.
* Member of the Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University School
of Law.
1Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Section 401(d), 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49
U.S.C.A. §481 (Supp. 1946). Under Section 401(a) of the Act, no carrier may
engage in air transportation unless it has in force a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity issued by the Board. 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A.
§481 (Supp. 1946).
2 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Section 2, 52 Stat. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A.
§402 (Supp. 1946).
3 (1) whether the new service will serve a useful public purpose responsive
to public need; (2) whether the purpose can and will be served as well by exist-
ing lines or carriers; (3) whether it can be served by the applicant without im-
pairing the operations of existing carriers contrary to the public interest; and
(4) whether any cost of the proposed service to the Government in the form of
mail subsidies or safety facilities will be outweighed by the benefit which will
accrue to the public from the new service. United A.L., Red Bluff Operation, 1
C.A.A. 778 (1940).
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mary factors in determining the paramount public interest in each fact sit-
uation presented. 4 These factors are:
(1) the benefit to the public from the new services;
(2) the financial and economic interest of the air carriers involved;
and
(3) the desirability of competition.
Because of the wide differences in ,individual fact situations, the differing
policies of Board members, and the apparent changing emphasis of the de-
cisions, it is difficult to reconcile the numerous opinions of the Board and
to anticipate the weight that may be given by the Board to each factor in
new fact situations.
Although decided in May 1946, The West Coast Case5 is at this writing
the most recent and comprehensive new route pronouncement of the Board
on domestic new route applications (other than the area cases involving
primary local or feeder line services). This case does much to indicate how
the Board will treat new route applications during the postwar transition
period of development of our national air transport system, and is perhaps
illustrative of the treatment the Board may be expected to give the second
and third factors. The Board, by a three to one decision, denied Western
Air Lines' application for a route competing with United Air Lines between
the enlarged traffic-producing cities of San Francisco, Portland and Seattle.
It held, that in this case, financial and economic considerations outweighed
the desirability of competition. The first factor (benefit to the public) 6
which is usually concerned with such matters as single plane service, non-
stop service, shorter routes, greater convenience to the users, etc., was not
of great relevance in this opinion. The case was re-opened and decision
on re-argument had not been handed down at this printing.
The Financial and Economic Factor. This factor divides into two
aspects: (a) the diversion of passengers and revenue which the new service
would cause to other carriers7 and (b) the increased economic security
which additional revenue from the new route would bring one of the appli-
cant carriers.8 The first aspect was given primary attention in The West
Coast Case; i.e., the financial effect of the diversion of revenue passengers
4 It is well-established that the Board is the sole arbiter of the paramount
public interest in domestic cases. United A.L. v. C.A.B., 155 F. (2d) 169
(C.C.A.D.C. 1946). In international cases the Board is the sole arbiter as the
President's advisor. Pan American Airways Inc. v. C.A.B., 121 F. (2d) 810
(C.C.A. 2nd, 1944).
5 - C.A.B. - (Docket No. 250 et al., May 22, 1946).
6 The public benefit factor was important in Braniff Air., Houston-Memphis-
Louisville Route, 2 C.A.B. 353 (1940); Eastern A.L., Birmingham.New Orleans
Non Stop Service, 2 C.A.B. 596 (1941); Braniff Air.,. Dallas-Kansas City Non
Stop Op., 3 C.A.B. 19 (1941); Continental A.L. et al., Texas Air Service, 4
C.A.B. 215 (1943); Eastern A.L. et al., Washington Service, 4 C.A.B. 325 (1943);
American Air. et. al., East-West California, 4 C.A.B. 297 (1943); Transcontinen-
tal & W. A., Detroit-St. Louis Non Stop, 6 C.A.B. 471 (1945); Braniff Air.,
Route No. 15 Restriction, 6 C.A.B. 515 (1945).
7 This factor was important in the following cases: National Air. et al.,
Daytona Beach-Jacksonville Op., 1 C.A.Ai 612 (1940); Pacific Alaska Airways,'
Seattle-Juneau Operation, 1 C.A.A. 683 (1940); Mid-Cont. Air., Twin Cities-
St. Louis Operation, 2 C.A.B. 63 (1940); Eastern A.L., Chicago-Nashville Non
Stop Op., 3 C.A.B. 24 (1941); Transcontinental & W. A. et al., Detroit-Memphis
Service, 6 C.A.B. 117 (1944); Western A.L. et al., Denver-Los Angeles Service,
6 C.A.B. 199 (1944); Colonial Air et. al., Washington-Ottawa-Montreal, 6
C.A.B. 481 (1945).
8 This factor was important in Continental A.L. et al., Denver-Kansas City
Service, 4 C.A.B. 1 (1942) (Continental strengthened); Colonial Air. et al.,
Atlantic Seaboard Op., 4 C.A.B. 552 and 4 C.A.B. 633 (1944) (National strength-
ened); Transcontinental & W. A. et al., Detroit-Memphis, 6 C.A.B. 117 (1944)
(Mid-Continent strengthened); Mid Continent Air. et al., Kansas City-New
Orleans, 6 C.A.B. 253 (1945) (Mid Continent further helped); and see note 15
infra for cases concerning Western,
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which the new services proposed by Western would inflict on United. The
majority decided that in the absence of other more important factors (and
it found none) it would not expose an established carrier whose financial
strength was showing a marked tendency to decline to additional impair-
ment by authorizing a competitive service when the present service was
satisfactory. Diversion of traffic has been considered important by the
Board because of its view that an economically sound air carrier can render
better service and compete more effectively, and also because financial self-
sufficiency makes substantial airmail subsidies by the government unneces-
sary.9 The significance of diversion is primarily a matter of degree and
has been considered controlling only where substantial. The percent of total
revenue passenger mileage diverted held to constitute a substantial diver-
gence has varied from only a few percent to 40% depending on the financial
status of the airline affected by the divergence. In The West Coast Case,
no finding was made as to the percentage of revenue United would lose by
competition from Western, although the determination of the probable
amount was feasible. Despite the importance generally given to diversion,
however, several decisions have limited its significance by declaring that
new services and routes would not be denied solely as a protection to a
particular carrier or carriers.
0 I
The dissent of Mr. Josh Lee pointed out that United's declining financial
strength merely paralleled that of the air transportation industry generally
in 1945 and asserted that general business trends should not be emphasized
in determining the over-riding public interest in a coordinated system of air
transportation. It is submitted that this view is questionable. In the early
part of 1946, the air transportation industry was showing decreasing profits
and mounting monthly deficits due to greatly increased operating expenses.
This was true of United and most other domestic air carriers." Private
capital was showing less confidence in airline investments.12 In this sit-
uation the majority of the CAB held that it would be unwise to subject any
carrier to further impairment of revenue. More recent data tends to indi-
cate that some carriers are solving their financial problems, but the policy
of The West Coast opinion in protecting the financial position of a carrier
by withholding competition would appear sound until the feasibility of
profitable operations is clearly shown.'3
9 However the airlines say, "It is no longer a question of subsidy. The gov-
ernment makes a big profit. It is probable that the results of the fiscal years
1943-1945 inclusive, will have produced a sufficient surplus of airmail revenues
over total costs of the service to offset most of the cumulative deficiency of the
preceding years." "A Review of Transportation Problems," March 20, 1946,
Air Transportation Association of America. The rates of the four largest air
carriers is 45¢ per ton mile; for other domestic air carriers it is generally 600
and higher. The government pays railroads 28¢ for slower service but charges
the public 30 per ounce compared to the new 50 figure for airmail.
10 Continental A.L. et al., Texas Air Service, 4 C.A.B. 215 (1943); Braniff
Air., Houston-Memphis-Louisville Route, 2 C.A.B. 353 (1940).11 West Coast Case, Appendix No. 4. Figures available at the time of the
decision indicated that only Continental and Mid-Continent were showing a bet-
ter net revenue position in 1946 than in 1945, and that Continental, Eastern,
Hawaiian and Mid-Continent were the only lines of the 20 domestic air carriers
that were able to show a profit. But these figures were for January and Feb-
ruary only. See note 13, infra.
12 E.g. The security underwriters of American Airlines had great difficulty
in selling its new security issues in June 1946, an inflationary period when even
new companies obtained large financing. Time Magazine, Vol. 48 No. 1, July
1, 1946.
13 Incomplete reports for 1946 indicate that a number of the airlines may be
solving their difficulties. For the 1946 June quarter, United showed a 72¢ a
share net income compared to 870 for 1945. For the 1946 September quarter,
United's profits decreased from $1,507,155 for 1945 to $1,502,571 for 1946. For
the entire year, it is probable that practically all the carriers' will show either
substantially lower profits or actual losses, however.
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The second aspect of the financial factor is the increased economic
security to Western which the additional revenue from the new route opera-
tion would bring. A number of previous decisions have been based on the
desirability of strengthening weaker carriers, not because of their size, but
.because of their poor financial and economic status,14 and several of these
cases were concerned with Western. 15 Concurring opinions in some cases
have stressed that the revenue and mileage positions of smaller carriers
should be built up because any great disparity in size between carriers is
not conducive to a balanced transportation system.' 6 However, the major-
ity opinions have consistently held that size differential is not controlling
in new route cases.17 In refusing an award to Western because of the di-
version to United, although United is a much larger carrier, the Board in
The West Coast Case affirms the majority policy.' s
The Competitive Factor - On the third factor, the desirability of com-
petition, 19 the conflict between the majority and dissenting doctrines in
The West Coast Case is illustrative of the Board's changing interpretation
of this requirement. The original view of the Board, which the dissent of
Mr. Lee followed in The West Coast Case, stressed that the policy of regu-
lated competition contemplated by the Act required service over comparable
or alternate routes between all major terminals, but not necessarily dupli-
14 See note 8 supra. Similar considerations have motivated commissions
in other transportation fields. Re Chi. and N. W. Ry. Co., P.U.R. 1917A 303
(Wis.); The New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 189 (1923); Texas &
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 277 (1937);
Contract Carriers, Inc., Common Carrier Application, 41 M.C.C. 165, 170 (1942);
West Coast Bus Lines, Common Carrier Application, 32 M.C.C. 619, 633 (1942).
15 American Air. et al., East-West California, 4 C.A.B. 297 (1943); Trans-
continental & W. A., North-South California, 4 C.A.B. 373 (1943); Western A.L.
et al., Denver-Los Angeles Service, 6 C.A.B. 199 (1944). And see Acquisition
of Western A.E. by United A.L., 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940).
16 "It seems to be a reasonable conclusion from the experience of rail car-
riers and air carriers alike that any great disparity in size between carriers is
not conducive to a balanced transportation system." Eastern A.L., Memphis-
Greenville Operation, 4 C.A.B. 429, 438 (1943) (concurring opinion); Western
A.L. et al., Denver-Los Angeles Service, 6 C.A.B. 199 (1944) (concurring opin-
ion) ; and see Jackson and Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts (1938) 86 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 231, 239 (anti-trust field).
17 E.g. "While there is nothing in the Act which requires us to maintain an
equality of size or financial strength among the air carriers subject to regula-
tion, the direction in the Act to foster sound economic conditions in air trans-
portation and to improve the relations between and coordinate transportation
by carriers makes it necessary that we keep in mind the financial position of
carriers since its ability to provide public service will be affected by its financial
position." Northwest Air. et al., Chicago-Milwaukee-New York, 6 C.A.B. 217
(1944) (majority opinion).
18 It should be noted that The West Coast Case also grants new local and
feeder routes to new, small carriers over the protests of both United and Western.
This is not inconsistent with the Board's policy that size of a carrier is not con-
trolling. The Board has consistently held that the low traffic potential and
marginal character of operation of local and feeder routes is not conducive to
satisfactory or efficient operation by trunk line carriers with their large planes
and luxury service.
Size is also important in airmail rate cases. Eastern, American, United and
TWA have a uniform 450 per ton mile rate under this policy, and PCA, Chicago
and Southern, Western, Hawaiian, Delta, Northwest, Braniff and National have
a uniform 600 rate.
19 Competitive considerations were important in the following cases: United
A.L.-Western A.E., Interchange of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723 (1940); Export
Air., Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16 (1940); Mid-Cont. Air., Twin Cities-
St. Louis Operation, 2 C.A.B. 63, 93 (1940); Transcontinental & W.A., North-
South California, 4 C.A.B. 254 (1943); Northeast Air. et al., Boston Service, 4
C.A.B. 686 (1943); Northeast Air. et al., North Atlantic Routes, 6 C.A.B. 319
(1945)..
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cating services. 20 This competition was supposed to form a yardstick for
measuring costs and preventing laxities in the service offered. The second
view of the Board enunciated a strong but not conclusive presumption that
competition is mandatory on any route which offers sufficient traffic to sup-
port competing services without an unreasonable increase in operating cost.21
Under this view Western would undoubtedly have received the award in
The West Coast Case as it was shown that traffic along the West Coast was
as great as several eastern routes which supported several carriers. A tran-
sition to the present view took place in The Boston Service Case.22 The
concurring opinion of that case, which the majority in effect accepts as its
philosophy in The West Coast Case, correctly pointed out that the use of a
"presumption" was erroneous and that the regulated competition envis-
ioned by Congress was not necessarily required to be fulfilled by duplicating,
comparable or alternate services between major terminals, but that the
"spirit of emulation" which spreads to routes that do not have direct com-
peting service will usually provide sufficient competitive incentive. 23 The
competitive factor is therefore now of equal importance with the financial
factor and the public benefit factor; affirmative evidence must be presented
to establish any one factor as paramount.
The Public Benefit Factor - The remaining and often foremost factor,
the benefit to the public from the new service, was not of great importance
in The West Coast Case and may best be illustrated by reference to the
Denver-Los Angeles Case.24 Prior to this opinion, transcontinental pas-
sengers to Los Angeles had the choice of through plane single company
service by American and TWA, or of connecting service at Salt Lake City
with Western's Route No. 13 to Los Angeles and United's Route No. 1 to
the East.25 About 41% of Western's total revenue passenger mileage came
from transcontinental passengers using Route No. 13, and this revenue
helped support Western's less profitable routes. It was estimated that about
80% of the total traffic expected to use United's proposed route from Den-
ver to Los Angeles would be transcontinental. Hence, Western contended
that if United were awarded the new route, these transcontinental passen-
gers would be diverted from their Route No. 13 to United. On the other
hand, United contended that the passengers on this transcontinental route
obviously would prefer through service by United rather than having to
20 United A.L.-Western A.E., Interchange of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723
(1940), Export Air., Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16, 34 (1940); Mid-Cont.
Air., Twin Cities-St. Louis Operation, 2 C.A.B. 63, 93 (1940).
21 Transcontinental & W.A., North-South California, 4 C.A.B. 254 (1943);
Colonial Air. et al., Atlantic Seaboard Op., 4 C.A.B. 552 (1943).
22 Northeast Air. et al., Boston Service, 4 C.A.B. 686 (1944).
23 The concurring opinion in the Boston Service Case quoted the Report of
Federal Aviation Commission, January, 1935, 61-62: "We have been fully con-
vinced by all we have seen and heard that the present high quality of American
air transport is due in large part to the competitive spirit that has existed
throughout its development. There has been little direct point-to-point com-
petition on identical routes, and what has existed has been comparatively un-
important. Of much greater benefit has been the availability of two or more
alternative routes, served by different companies, between widely separated cen-
ters . . . Perhaps of even greater importance, however, is the spirit of emula-
tion that exists even between organizations that could not by any conceivable
possibility be in direct competition with each other. If any airline running from
coast to coast acquires faster and more comfortable airplanes, it takes but little
time for the patrons of a line running up and.down the Mississippi Valley to
complain if it fails to make the same advances."
24 Western A.L. et al., Denver-Los Angeles Service, 6 C.A.B. 199 (1944).
25 TWA received the majority of this business, while the United-Western
connection generally secured less than 15% of the passengers. Before the war,
day passengers had to change planes at Salt Lake City while on sleeper planes
the passengers remained aboard and the carriers changed crews. United A.L.-
Western A.E., Interchange of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723 (1940). The Denver-
Los Angeles route had not been flown previously chiefly because of the lack of
aircraft which could easily fly over the mountainous area.
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change planes at Denver, and the public interest thereby would be better
served by a decision for United. The Board's opinion, recently affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, 26 held that the public interest in maintaining Western
as a strong regional carrier was paramount to the public interest repre-
sented by the convenience of the great majority of persons who would use
this new route.27
The above discussion attempts to analyze how the Board weighs the
three principal factors - the Public Benefit Factor, the Financial and Eco-
nomic Factor, and the Competitive Factor - to determine which is para-
mount according to the particular facts involved. The flexibility of the
Board's formula is demonstrated by pointing out that new facts in both the
West Coast and Denver-Los Angeles cases could lead to reversal without any
change in standards by the Board. For example, if Western demonstrated
that United's profit position is strong enough to stand the diversion of
competing service, the Board could hold that the desirability of competi-
tion outweighed the financial factors. And at the same time, such addi-
tional routes might give Western increased financial security to withstand
the diversion caused by giving United a through transcontinental route to
Los Angeles. With the four engine long range aircraft now available to the
airlines, the public benefit from through-plane-one-company service is even
more apparent, 28 and recent statements by Chairman Landis indicate that
he realizes that the DC-3 pattern of domestic air routes is clearly unsuit-
able for operation with the more modern equipment. 29 Thus in awarding
certificates of convenience and necessity for new routes, the Board's func-
tion is primarily the analysis. of complex factual situations to determine
which factor at that time represents the paramount public interest.
E. V. Jr.
26 United A.L. v. C.A.B., 155 F. (2d) 169 (C.C.A.D.C. 1946).
27 This was contrary to the Examiner's opinion that "while the route will
have a serious adverse effect upon Western, the record demonstrates that the
benefits which can be secured by the transcontinental operation will outweigh
the disadvantages to Western." The Examiner's Report, p. 28, The Denver-
Los Angeles Case.
2s American Air., Consolidation of Routes, C.A.B. - (Docket No. 932
et al., Sept. 23, 1946).
29 These speeches by Mr. Landis were given on December 12 and 13, 1946,
at the Harvard Club of Washington and the Harvard Law School Forum in
Cambridge. See American Aviation Daily, Vol. 48, page 215.
